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Summary
In this paper we study the problem of exhaustible resources and renewable resources in
a theoretical endogenous growth framework, under various assumptions. In particular,
we consider the hypotheses that those two inputs are or are not technologically perfect
substitutes of each other. Moreover, we develop the starting model accounting for the
negative externality of waste accumulation. Finally, a comparative analysis is made
between Pigouvian tax and waste recycling as an environmental policy to internalize the
negative externality represented by refuse accumulation.
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In the mists of time our forefathers basically used just renewable resources, like
water, wind, and wood, to produce energy. It was only with the industrial revo-
lution and the invention of the internal-combustion engine that we increased the
use of non-renewable resources like oil, coke, etc. The cohabitation of both kinds
of natural resources has thus become the rule in economic systems all over the
world. The increasing use of exhaustible resources creates two kinds of problem:
…rstly, the price of this type of input is increasing; secondly, a negative external-
ity is generated in terms of pollution discharged into the environment. To o¤-set
the constraint to growth represented by the presence of non-renewable inputs,
economic systems have been forced to resort to the so-called ”backstop tech-
nologies” phenomenon, that is the employment of the same renewable sources
of energy as previously, but utilizing new processes (Nordhaus, 1974).
In the real world there has been such a general economic interest in energy
technology development over the last few years that venture capital disburse-
ments have risen sharply (The Economist, 2001, p.64). Future scienti…c im-
provements will probably allow us to achieve the optimal growth path of the
economy: ethanol, for example, derived from a renewable resource (sugarcane),
is (or could become) a good substitute for gasoline (Goldember et al., 2001,
Anderson, 2001). Roughly speaking, a lot of attention is being paid to tech-
nological discoveries regarding the increase in renewable input utilization, such
as energy sources and ways to avoid the depletion of non-replenishable inputs.
This dynamic substitution process may help to lead economic systems towards
more sustainable paths.
Following the seminal paper of Hotelling (1931), since the late nineteen-
sixties many theoretical studies have been carried out on exhaustible resources,
such as those of Anderson (1972), Barbier (1999), Cummings (1969), Hoel
(1978), Kamien and Schwartz (1978), Krautkraemer (1989), Schou (2000), Solow
(1974a), Stiglitz (1974), Tahvonen (1997), Vousden (1973).2 Each of these pa-
pers has placed emphasis on some aspects of the issue: the common access to
the resource studied, the role of the discount rate, ore quality selection, tech-
nological change, the environmental costs of mining exhaustible resources, etc.;
none of them, however, takes into account the presence of renewable resources.
Another line of economic literature deals with renewable natural resources:
this includes the works of Plourde (1970), Huhtala (1999), Di Vita (2002),
Mendelssohn and Sobel (1980), Olson and Roy (1996, 2000), Tahvonen and
Kuuluvainen (1993). This current is less substantial, because for this kind of
input the main problem is just to ensure its optimal harvest rate. Finally, only
a few studies combine renewable and non-replenishable natural resources in the
same model (see D’Arge and Kogiku, 1973, Dasgupta and Heal, 1974, Kemp
and Van Long, 1980, Smith, 1974, Tahvonen and Salo, 2001). In particular, in
all these works of research the kinds of replenishable natural sources of energy
considered are eolian, solar, geothermal, biomass, etc.; they do not entertain the
2For a detailed survey of this …eld of literature, see Krautkraemer (1999).
2hypothesis of deriving a good substitute for exhaustible resources from agricul-
tural farming (like ethanol from sugarcane).
The latter studies shed light on the relationship between the two kinds of
natural resources mentioned here, but they do not take into consideration at
least three problems. First, a reproductive function for renewable resources is
not explicitly introduced in those models. Second, the problem of substitutabil-
ity between exhaustible and renewable resources is viewed in terms of costs
only and not from the angle of technological possibility. Third, the negative
externalities associated with the presence of a non-renewable resource and with
waste accumulation is not accounted for. Our paper will try to bridge this gap
in economic literature.
Our main intuition is that inserting in our model the hypothesis of a natu-
ral input derived from agricultural farming may shed light on the relationship
between exhaustible and renewable resources, so it is worth exploring; thus we
introduce a logistic function for it in the model. The problem of substitutability
between the two kinds of natural resource is at the same time economic and
technological, such that endogenous knowledge acquisition plays a fundamental
part in our analysis. Finally, we cannot ignore the negative externality repre-
sented by waste accumulation, and the possible remedies for this cause of market
failure.
This study attempts to answer the following questions: how can the intro-
duction of a parameter representing the degree of technological substitutability
between exhaustible and renewable resources change the known results in this
…eld? Is technological change relevant to explain the process of internalization
of negative externality represented by refuse accumulation? Is it better to in-
troduce a Pigouvian tax or promote waste recycling, to reduce litter ‡ow to its
optimal level?
Our results show that if the two kinds of natural production factors are not
perfect substitutes of each other, the economic system cannot achieve the opti-
mal growth path. New scienti…c discovery has three kinds of spillover: it allows
us to alleviate the burden on the economic system represented by exhaustible
resources, by removing the obstacles to using renewable natural inputs instead
of non-replenishable ones; it increases the amount of waste that may be recycled;
and it reduces the price of reproducible resources. Finally, while Pigouvian tax
and waste recycling have the same e¤ects when the static …rst order conditions
are considered, secondary materials production causes a positive externality in
terms of dynamic e¢ciency, making it possible to reduce the amount of ex-
haustible resources mined.
The problem of imperfect substitutability between exhaustible and renew-
able natural input is well known in economic literature (Dasgupta and Heal,
1974), but has not been fully explored. Solow (1974b) a¢rms:”... As you
would expect, the degree of substitutability is also a key factor. If it is very easy
to substitute other factors for natural resources, then there is in principle ’no
problem’. ... ”. Under the hypothesis of perfect substitutability, there is some
’back-stop technology’, such that production is not limited by the exhaustible
resource; if there is no substitute for the non-replenishable input, on the other
3hand, catastrophe is unavoidable. Solow suggests that there is a wide range of
cases in between, in which the question is real, interesting and not foreclosed;
he thus emphasizes the role of elasticity of substitution between the two inputs.
In this paper we formally introduce the assumptions that the two kinds of
resources may or may not be technologically perfect substitutes of each other.
The negative externality represented by litter accumulation is accounted for in
formal analysis. Finally, we try to …nd solutions to the problem of using waste
recycling or Pigouvian tax to internalize the negative externality represented by
refuse. These are problems that have been ignored in previous research.
Our endogenous growth model consists basically of two sectors. The …nal
output is produced in the …rst, while knowledge is accumulated in the second.
When the waste recycling process is considered, there are three industries in-
volved. A standard Cobb-Douglas production function is assumed. Among
other inputs, we consider two natural resources, one exhaustible and the other
replenishable. The condition that the two natural resources used here are per-
fect substitutes of each other makes analysis simple, but could be unrealistic,
because in this case it could be di¢cult to see the problems involved in using
one natural input instead of another. Thus it is interesting to see what happens
when the hypothesis of imperfect substitutability is considered. Physical capi-
tal is accrued by means of net investment. The dynamics of technology stock
is the same as in Romer (1990). New scienti…c discoveries are neither exoge-
nous nor costless, but depend on the labor time allotted to this aim (Kamien
and Schwartz, 1978). The amount of exhaustible resources available declines at
the same rate as that of extraction. A logistic function describes the behavior
over time of the renewable natural resources stock. The utility level depends on
consumption and on the amount of waste accumulated. This is a quite widely
accepted assumption, in models dealing with growth and pollution.
The optimal growth path is constrained by the amount of labor time available
in our economy, that we assume constant for the sake of simplicity.
In section three, we consider the possibility that the waste derived from
exhaustible resources can be recycled: this reduces not only the amount of litter
discharged into the environment but also the ‡ow of this kind of natural input
extracted from the world’s crust. For renewable resources, the main problem
is to …nd the optimal rate of harvest, thus the problem of recycling the waste
derived from this kind of input may be ignored.
To simplify the reading of the paper we denote the parameters with greek
letters: lambda represents the dynamic multipliers, the capital letters are the
stock variables and the small letters are the ‡ow variables; …nally, asterisks
indicate the optimal values.
The remainder of the paper is as follows. After the description of the model,
we derive the …rst order conditions. Section 3 is devoted to extending the model
and making some comparative analysis. Conclusive remarks and implications
for environmental political economy are the subject of the last section.
We con…ne the mathematical details to the appendix.
42 A Model with Exhaustible and Renewable Re-
sources
We start by presenting a simple theoretical framework, in which both kinds of
natural resource are considered. The production function of the …nal output
y depends on …ve inputs: physical capital K, stock of technology A, labor time
devoted to …nal output production l1, rate of use of exhaustible resources e,
amount of renewable resources harvested r. The total number of skilled workers
N is assumed constant and normalized to one. Labor may be used not only
to produce the …nal output but also in R&D activity l2,s u c ht h a t1=l1 + l2.
In what follows we are interested only in interior solutions, in which li > 0,
for i =1 ;2. Technology (or knowledge) is accumulated as a consequence of the
labor time allotted to this purpose (Romer, 1990). In other words, technological
change is at the same time costly and not fortuitous: it depends on the e¤ort
devoted to this aim and is an outcome of a sector of our economy (Kamien and
Schwartz, 1978, Romer, 1990). All the variables considered in the model are
functions of the time t; just to make the reading of the paper easier we will
suppress the subscript (t) in the ensuing discussion.
The production function is
[1] y = f(K;A;l1;e;r)=K®1 (Al1)





where Ã is a parameter describing the kind of technological substitutability
between exhaustible and renewable resources. In this way, if Ã =1 ,w em a yu s e
e or r indiscriminately. If this condition is not satis…ed (i.e. 0 <Ã<1)w ea r e
in a case of imperfect substitutability, for which the marginal productivity of e
and r will be not the same, and the elasticity of substitution between those two
inputs will be lower than in the hypothesis in which Ã =1 .
The law motion of physical capital is
[2]
:
K = y ¡ c,w h e r eK(0) = K0 and K(t) ¸ 0:
[2] is a constraint which considers the change of physical capital over time.
For the sake of simplicity, depreciation in K is not considered here. Aggregate
consumption is denoted by c = xy,w i t h0 <x· 1. Per capita consumption is
represented by c = c=N. Aggregate saving is s = zy =
:
K,w h e r e0 · z<1,a n d
z =( 1¡ x):
[3]
:
A = »l2A; where A(0) = A0 > 0; and A(t) ¸ 0:
Equation [3]; which is of an endogenous nature, describes the stock of tech-
nology accumulated, where »>0 is a productive parameter of scienti…c research
(Romer, 1990).
[4] _ E = ¡e; where E(0) = E0 > 0, E(t) ¸ 0:
:
E considers the dynamics of the exhaustible resource stock E as a function of
the ‡ow of virgin ores extracted from the world’s crust (for a similar speci…cation
see Vousden, 1973).






R ¡ r; where R(0) = R0, R(t) ¸ 0:
Equation [5] expresses the behavior over time of the renewable resource stock
R.W ea s s u m et h a tf (R) is the growth function, with properties f (R) ¸ 0; for
0 · R · ¼; f
0








(R) < 0 for
_
R · R · ¼;
where
_
R is the maximum sustainable yield stock level of our renewable resource,
and ¼ is the ecological carrying capacity (Hanley et al., 1997, Li and Löfgren,
2000). ¾ denotes the intrinsic growth rate of renewable resources, while r,e q u a l
to ½R, is the harvest ‡ow of this natural input, ½ being the rate of use of R
(where 0 · ½ · 1). The assumption regarding the …rst derivative of the natural
production function f
0
(R); is justi…ed by the fact that this kind of resource
has a maximum point and then decreases to zero. Thus there is a maximum
sustainable yield, that in equilibrium should be equal to the highest possible
harvest rate (Clark, 1999).
[6]
:
J = d ¡ °J =( e + r) ¡ °J; J(0) = J0, J (t) ¸ 0:
This is the motion equation of the waste stock J (Smith, 1972); it is a func-
tion of the litter ‡ow d produced in the economy (as a by-product of the trans-
formation of inputs into outputs), minus the amount of J that the ecosystem is
capable of absorbing by biodegradation. 0 · °<1 is a parameter representing
the capacity of the environment to assimilate waste (Huhtala, 1999, Plourde,
1972). As the forerunners of waste management analysis observed, the conser-
vation of matter principle makes it possible to a¢rm that, in a closed system,
the tonnage of raw materials utilized by an economy is approximately equal
to the weight of waste generated (D’Arge and Kogiku, 1973). In formal terms
d = e + r. This speci…cation of waste stock dynamics re‡ects the materials
balance approach, for which any material input will be returned to the envi-
ronment in some kind of waste (Ayres, 1999, Huhtala, 1999, Radetzki and Van
Duyne, 1985).
The welfare of society, at any point in time, is a function of the per capita
‡ow of consumption and the stock of waste (D’Arge and Kogiku, 1973, Hoel,
1978, Huhtala, 1999, Keeler et al., 1971, Lusky, 1976, Plourde, 1972, Smith,
1972, Tahvonen, 1997). The inclusion of J in our utility function indicates
that we will pay a price to reduce the amount of residuals accumulated. The
instantaneous utility function can be indicated by






,w i t hµ;°;! > 0:
[7] has continuous …rst and second partial derivatives, with uc > 0;u cc < 0;
uJ < 0;u JJ < 0 and UcJ =0 .I ti sa s s u m e dt h a tf o rc ! 0, uc ! +1,w h e r eµ
and ! are two more parameters, representing the elasticity of marginal utility
with respect to consumption and waste stock.
Assuming that the case of Ã =1prevails, the current-value Hamiltonian @
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¡¸5 [(e + r) ¡ °J]+¸6 (1 ¡ l1 ¡ l2);
where ¸i;i=1 ;2;3;4;5;6; are the dynamic multipliers of the stock variables.
Note that we consider the shadow price of waste to be negative, because it
generates disutility.
First order conditions for an optimal solution, together with the usual transver-
sality constraints, are con…ned to Appendix A.3 Here it is assumed that all the
conditions in Theorem 9 of Seierstad and Sydæter (1997, p. 217), together with
the concavity on the maximized Hamiltonian, are satis…ed.
3 Investigating the Model Behavior Under Dif-
ferent Hypotheses
In what follows, we shall use the theoretical framework outlined in the previous
paragraph to analyse the relationship between exhaustible and renewable re-
sources. First of all, we assume perfect substitutability in the production func-
tion between these two natural inputs; we then introduce some complication
into the model, to take into account the hypothesis of imperfect substitutabil-
ity. Further on, we extend the model to consider what happens when waste
recycling occurs, in cases where it is not indi¤erent whether secondary materi-
als are used instead of one or both of the natural resources considered. Finally,
the use of Pigouvian tax to internalize the negative externality represented by
waste accumulation is evaluated here. We conclude this paragraph by making
a comparison between waste recycling and Pigouvian tax, as instruments to
increase welfare and achieve the optimal amount of litter discharged into the
environment.
3.1 The Basic Model
The …rst question that we should tackle is: how does the presence of a renewable
natural input in‡uence the dynamics of the exhaustible resources stock? To this
aim we may use [A3]; after putting in evidence e, and substituting in [4],t h e
result is




From the equation above we may see that an increase in the rate of use of
renewable resources allows us to reduce the extraction of e by the same amount,
and that a negative relationship exists between _ E and ¸4.I n o t h e r w o r d s ,
under a condition of perfect substitutability between the two natural resources
3For expositional reasons, the demonstration that the model exhibits a unique optimal
saddle point is omitted. It was derived following a standard procedure similar to that of
Schou (2000). The formal proof is available, upon request, from the author.
7taken into account here, the …rst step to o¤-set the constraint to growth due
to exhaustible resource consumption is to increase the use of renewable natural
input.
Now the problem is to de…ne the role played by technological change in
alleviating the constraint to growth represented by non-replenishable resources.
To answer this question we use [A2]; [3] and the condition l1 + l2 =1 .
After some algebra, and calculating the implicit derivative of e¤ with respect









2 (®3 ¡ 1)
¤ < 0:
Thus we may say that there is an inverse relationship between the rate of use
of the exhaustible resource and changes in knowledge accumulation, represented
by the parameter of productivity in this sector of our economy (where gA is the
growth rate of stock of technology). An increase in knowledge allows us to reduce
the pressure on the environment in di¤erent ways: improving the e¢ciency of
the use of inputs through the new production process; diminishing dependence
on the non-replenishable input; increasing the possibility of using other inputs
in place of the exhaustible ones.
So far we have dealt only with the …rst order static conditions, from which we
can say that one more unit of renewable input allows us to reduce consumption
of exhaustible resources by the same amount, and that technological progress
reduces the quantity of e extracted from the earth’s crust. It is worth taking
a look at the …rst order dynamic conditions. Starting from [A14], putting in
evidence ± and substituting in [A13], we obtain
[11] g¸3 = g¸4 + ¾ (1 ¡ 2R=¼) ¡ ½;
such with an increase in the rate of use of the renewable resource ½,t h e
growth rate of the shadow price of exhaustible resource decreases. In the
stationary growth path, however, it always proves that g¸3 = g¸4; such that
¾(1 ¡ 2R=¼) ¡½ =0 . During transitional dynamics an increased use of renew-
able resources allows us to reduce pressure on the exhaustible natural input and
its price.
To investigate how technology in‡uences the dynamics of ¸3, we may put in
evidence ± in [A11] and then substitute in [A13], to …nd








From [12] it is clear that the greater the changes in technological stock over
time, the lower g¸3 will be. An increase in the absolute accumulation rate of
knowledge diminishes the demand for exhaustible resources and mitigates the
dynamics of ¸3.
Using the model described in the last section, and the …rst order conditions,
we may say that the shadow prices of both natural inputs will be the same in
the stationary growth path. The shadow prices of e and r will grow at the same
rate in the steady state equilibrium, such that Hotelling’s rule is veri…ed also for
8renewable resources. This result holds if and only if ¾(1 ¡ 2R=¼) ¡ ½ =0 .I n
other words Hotelling’s rule is veri…ed for renewable resources only in the case
of @ _ R=@R =0 ; this implies that in the optimal path, the e¤ective growth rate
of renewable resource should be equal to its rate of use.
3.2 Imperfect Substitutability Between Exhaustible and
Renewable Resources
The assumption employed in the previous section, for which it is possible to use
one natural input instead of another indi¤erently in the production function,
makes analysis simple, but may not always prove realistic. Thus it is worth
highlighting what happens if the two resources are not perfect substitutes of
each other. We assume this condition because historically, while exhaustible
resources generally o¤er a greater productivity than renewable ones, the latter
do not represent a constraint to growth, because the main problem is merely to
harvest them at the optimal rate.
To extend the model to a case in which we assume imperfect substitutability
between exhaustible and renewable resources, we have to consider the param-
eter Ã, under the hypothesis that 0 <Ã<1, in our production function and
Hamiltonian. In this case only two …rst order conditions change with respect to
t h ec a s ei nw h i c hÃ =1 ; the others remain unaltered, in particular the deriva-
tive of @ with respect to e and r, that is easy to calculate. Using @@=@e,a n d
[3] we obtain




Comparing [9] with the equation above, it is evident that in cases of imperfect
substitutability we will extract more exhaustible resources from the world’s
crust. When Ã =1 , in fact, one more unit of renewable natural input allows
us to save the same amount of non-replenishable ones. Thus we can a¢rm that
the hypothesis of perfect substitutability between the two natural resources
considered is better for the environment.
It is interesting to see whether the e¤ects of technological change on the rate
of use of exhaustible resources, in a case of imperfect substitutability between
e and r,a r et h es a m ea si nc a s eÃ. To this aim we again use @@=@e, [3] and the
constraint l1 + l2 =1 .
Using some simple algebra and evaluating the implicit derivative of e with









2 (®3 ¡ 1)
¤ < 0:
By means of [10], it is easy to see that in this case, under ceteris paribus con-
ditions, the reduction of the rate of use of non-replenishable natural inputs will
be smaller than in the case where the two natural inputs are perfect substitutes
of each other.
9The …rst order dynamic conditions remain formally unaltered, under the
hypothesis of imperfect substitutability between e and r.
In cases where Ã<1, the shadow prices of exhaustible and renewable
resources will be di¤erent in the stationary growth path. This implies that
Hotelling’s rule will also be satis…ed if and only if ¾ (1 ¡ 2R=¼) ¡ ½ =0 .B u t ,
unlike that obtained under the assumption Ã =1 , this is not an implicit result
of the model, because [A19] does not hold if Ã<1. Thus, combining [A14] with





>g ¸4 if ¾(1 ¡ 2R=¼) >½
= g¸4 if ¾(1 ¡ 2R=¼)=½
<g ¸4 if ¾(1 ¡ 2R=¼) <½
:
I nt h ec a s ew h e r eg¸3 = g¸4, corresponding to the middle row of [15],t h e
system is at its optimal growth path; in the other hypotheses the economic
system runs the risk of diverging from its optimal growth path. If we are under-
utilizing renewable resources (i.e. ¾ (1 ¡ 2R=¼) >½ ), the growth rate of ¸3 will
be higher than its optimal value, thus over-exploiting the exhaustible natural
input. Vice-versa, when the growth rate of the shadow price of the exhaustible
resource is lower than its optimal value (i.e. ¾(1 ¡ 2R=¼) <½ )w ea r eo v e r -
sweating the renewable natural input. In the …rst case there is a risk of depleting
exhaustible resources, while in the second hypothesis the danger is of using up
the replenishable resource. In both cases the economic system is addressed
toward an unsustainable growth path.
3.3 Waste Recycling Under Imperfect Substitutability be-
tween Natural Resources
In the simple version of the model there are two forces at work that may o¤-set
the constraint to growth represented by exhaustible resources: the increasing
use of renewable natural inputs and technological progress. The results of the
previous section show that when natural resources are not perfect substitutes
of each other, the scarcity of non-replenishable resources may bring the system
to exploit both natural inputs. This suggests that we should look for another
channel to move the economic system towards more environmentally friendly
behavior. Thus we want to extend our model further, to include the recycling
of waste derived from non-renewable resources, and see what happens in this
hypothesis.
The process of transforming litter into secondary input is considered both
a good pollution abatement technology and a system to o¤-set the scarcity
of exhaustible resources (Di Vita, 2002, Huhtala, 1999, Lusky, 1976, Smith,
1974). In this case we assume that there is another production process inside
the economic system, transforming waste into a substitute input by using the
refuse derived from exhaustible resources. We do not consider the possibility
of transforming litter from reproducible natural input into secondary materials,
because for this kind of input the main problem is to achieve their optimal
10harvest rate. Indeed, the environment has a greater capacity to absorb waste
derived from renewable resources.
To produce the secondary material m it will be necessary to devote some
labor time to the third sector of our economy l3. In cases where waste recycling
occurs the constraint on labor time will be l1 + l2 + l3 =1 :
The Cobb-Douglas production function of secondary materials is
[16] m = f(e;l3)=e¹1l
¹2
3 ; with ¹1 + ¹2 =1 ;
that exhibits constant returns to scale. In continuous time we may over-
look the temporal lag between extraction, use and recycling of the exhaustible
resource, because the di¤erences are not so important as for the ‡ows in the
previous period (Hoel, 1978). In particular, with regard to the process of trans-
formation of refuse into input, the most relevant phenomenon in magnitude is
the so-called ”closed-loop” (i.e. the recycling of new scrap inside the production
process). For example, pyro-processing R&D was part of the U.S. Integrated
Fast Reactor development program, which proposed that a reprocessing and
fuel-recycling plant be integrated into each reactor complex (van Hippel, 2001).
This means that transformation of residuals into input has more and more
frequently become another stage in the production process. In other words,
recycling increases the e¤ective long-term supplies of the resources that are be-
ing reused (Solow, 1974b, Tietenberg, 1992, Weinstein and Zeckhauser, 1974).
Finally, it is worth noting that it is cheaper to recycle the current ‡ow of waste
than previously stored residuals.
The motion equation of waste stock becomes
[17]
:
J = d¡m¡°J =( e + r)¡e¹1l
¹2
3 ¡°J;where J (0) = J0,a n dJ (t) ¸ 0;
where the accumulation of litter is reduced as an e¤ect of the recycling
process. It is interesting to note that if l3 =0 , [17] i st h es a m ea s[6].M o r e o v e r ,
while the shadow price of waste is negative, because litter reduces the welfare
level, the dynamic multiplier of secondary materials will be the same as that
of an exhaustible resource, because in our model they are perfect substitutes of
each other.
Under these new conditions and using the constraints expressed in equations
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¸6 (1 ¡ l1 ¡ l2 ¡ l3):
In this case few …rst order conditions change with respect to the case where














and we have to consider the marginal productivity of labor employed in the









¡ ¸6 =0 .
The above equation is the standard …rst order condition for optimal employ-
ment of labor in transforming litter into substitute inputs. The other …rst order
and dynamic conditions are the same as in the previous version of the model.
[19] is worthy of some comment, because the addend ¸5¹1 (m=e) represents
the positive e¤ects of waste recycling. It is none other than the value of the
marginal productivity of refuse derived from exhaustible resources transformed
into substitute input.
To understand the e¤ect on the rate of extraction of exhaustible resources,
of transforming refuse (from non-reproducible natural input) into secondary
materials, we may use [19]; we calculate the partial derivative of e with respect
to ¹1 (that is a coe¢cient that measures the productivity of non-replenishable








This means that an increase in the marginal productivity of waste recycling
reduces the amount of exhaustible resources taken from the earth’s crust.







= ¸3 ¡ ¸4.
The above equation implies that the two shadow prices will never be the
same under the assumption Ã<1, such that ¸3 will be always greater than
¸4. Where the …rst addend on the left side of the equation measures the loss
of marginal productivity due to imperfect substitutability, the second addend
accounts for the positive e¤ects of waste recycling. In other words, the litter
recovery process increases the di¤erence between ¸3 and ¸4.
Putting in evidence ¸4 in [22] and calculating the partial derivative of the







such that we may a¢rm that a rise in productivity of the waste recycling
activity allows us to reduce the price of r.
Starting from [19]; under the assumption for which A = _ A=l2»,w em a y
calculate the partial derivative of m with respect to », to investigate the e¤ects
of an increase in the e¢ciency of knowledge accumulation on the process of


















Thus we may a¢rm that technological improvement allows us to increase
the amount of secondary materials produced.
12To examine how secondary materials production modi…es the dynamics of
the exhaustible resources’ shadow price, we put in evidence ¸3 in [19] and sub-






3 (1 + lne) > 0.
This means that waste recycling increases by ¸3 over time, such that this
process sends the right message to the economic system, diminishing the oppor-
tunity cost of using renewable resources instead of non-replenishable ones.
To take into account the e¤ects of secondary materials production upon the
behaviour over time of the dynamic multiplier of r, we combine [19] with @@=@r
in cases where Ã<1; substituting in [A9] and partially deriving with respect














¡ ¾ + ½
¶¸
< 0
This means that the production of secondary materials reduces the dynamics
of the shadow prices of renewable natural resources.
Moreover, it is worth considering waste recycling in our analysis not only be-
cause this process increases the e¢ciency of exhaustible resource use (Weinstein
and Zeckhauser, 1974), but also because it improves the standard of welfare.
It is possible to ignore the refuse discharge problem as long as J has no major
e¤ects on social welfare, but when, as a result of an increase in income, the
stock of scrap goes beyond a certain threshold level (i.e. d>° J), we can a¢rm
that accumulation creates a loss of utility, measured by ¸5; this is the negative
shadow price of waste, and represents an externality cost of the use of both
kinds of natural inputs considered in this model. Without an environmental
policy, therefore, the dynamic multipliers of e and r will be higher than their
optimal values, in cases where the externality is fully internalized. This is why
the economic system is led to over-use both kinds of natural resources.
By means of [A2], calculating the partial derivative of ¸5 with respect to
®3, we are able to show that the negative externality represented by waste







[¸1 + ®3 ln(e + Ãr)] > 0.
If no pollution abatement policy is adopted, growth increases consumption
but also reduces welfare as a consequence of waste accumulation. The net result
on the welfare level of those two opposite e¤ects is not immediately evident: at
the moment, by using @@=@e for Ã<1 and [A1], and knowing that uJ =
¸5 (derived from @@=@J =0 ), it is just possible to a¢rm that the marginal
utility of consumption is sub-optimal high, because the negative e¤ects of waste
accumulation are not taken into account.4
4Note that at an individual level the utility function is u(c), because consumption is ri-
valrous and excludible, while the negative e¤ects of waste stock accumulation are a public
bad, such that consumers do not take the latter into consideration in their decisions (for the
di¤erence between centralized and market choices in a similar environment, see Lusky, 1975).
13[28] uC =
(¸3 + ¸5)(e + Ãr)
®3y
From the point of view of the benevolent social planner, it is necessary to
follow some environmental policy to internalize the negative externality. Here
we consider two possible instruments: waste recycling and Pigouvian taxes. In
the following part of this section we shall deal with the …rst.
The best way to ensure that the optimal amount of waste is recycled is to
make the marginal disutility of litter @U=@J equal to the value of an increase in
secondary materials production, due to the recycling of one more unit of refuse
derived from the exhaustible resource ¸5@m=@e. 5
Remember that we have assumed secondary materials to be perfect substi-
tutes of exhaustible resources, such that the condition regarding the optimal
amount of waste recycled implies that the shadow price of exhaustible resource
should be equal to its marginal productivity.
Calculating the …rst order condition of the Hamiltonian with respect to the
waste stock, we get
[29] @@=@J = ¡°J! + °¸5 =0or J! = ¸5;
where uJ = ¡°J!. Considering that ¸5@m=@e = ¸5¹1(m=e),u s i n gt h e












we observe that the optimal level of refuse recycled ensures that the value
of the marginal productivity of exhaustible resources is equal to its own shadow
price, thus fully internalizing the negative externality represented by refuse pro-
duction. It is worth noting that the result above holds if and only if ¸5 =0 .
Now we are able to take into account the problem regarding the net e¤ect
of growth on welfare, by means of its net changes ¢w
[31] ¢w = @u=@c ¡ @u=@J,
by using @@=@e for Ã<1 and [A1], and knowing that uJ = ¸5, without the
waste recycling process, the result is
[32] ¢w = @u=@c ¡ @u=@J =









We may compare this with the net e¤ects on welfare when secondary mate-
rials production is at its optimal level ¢W¤
[33] ¢w¤ =
¸3 (e + Ãr)
®3y
:
It is immediately clear that ¢w¤ > ¢w,f o r (e + Ãr)=®3y<1 (this result
comes from @@=@e,w h e nÃ<1). In other words the optimal amount of waste
recycling ensures the maximum level of welfare.
5In other words, ¸5 (@m=@e) is none other than the value of the reduction in loss of total
utility, in one more unit of waste not discharged into the environment.
143.4 Pigouvian Taxes as an Instrument to Achieve the Max-
imum Level of Welfare
As an alternative to the waste recycling process we may internalize the negative
externality represented by litter accumulation by imposing a Pigouvian tax ¿ on
both the shadow prices of natural resources. In cases of both perfect and imper-
fect technological substitutability between exhaustible and renewable resources,
¿¤ should be equal to ¸5, such that both shadow prices of natural inputs will be
equal to their own marginal productivity and the negative externality upon the
utility function wil be fully internalized. First of all we have to say something
about cases in which waste recycling is used, because in this hypothesis we have
levied a Pigouvian tax on the waste derived from replenishable resources. After
this clari…cation, we may deal with the case in which the aim to internalize
the negative externality is reached by resorting to Pigouvian tax. In the latter
situation, using [A2] and [A3], the shadow prices of resources become









When ¿¤ is levied on both prices of natural inputs, this ensures that the
shadow prices of both natural resources considered will be equal to their marginal
productivity; this is also true for Ã<1.
To account for the e¤ect of Pigouvian tax on the changes over time of ¸3 and
¸4 we may use [A8] and [A9] and substituting, respectively, for both dynamic
multipliers [A2] and [A3],w eg e t
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.
In this case there are no e¤ects on the behavior over time of both shadow
prices of natural inputs.
By means of [31] we may see that when a Pigouvian is levied, the net e¤ect
of growth on welfare, by means of net changes ¢wT;is
[38] ¢wT = @u=@c ¡ @u=@J =
¸3 (e + Ãr)
®3y
,
that is the same as in the case of waste recycling.
Now, what can we say about the question whether the mixed regime (waste
recycling and Pigouvian tax) is better than the pure regime in which ¿¤ is levied
on both prices of natural resources? From static …rst order conditions, it is just
possible to say that the performances of the economy represented in our model
are the same; no di¤erences emerge. The problem is the dynamics. In cases
15where only Pigouvian tax is applied there are no e¤ects on technology accu-
mulation, and on the behavior during time of both prices of natural resources.
The previous results regarding the dynamic e¤ects of waste recycling could be
questionable because referred to the single di¤erential equation. Thus it could
be interesting to make a sensitivity analysis on the Hamiltonian as a whole to
derive more general insights.
3.5 A Comparison Between Waste Recycling and Pigou-
vian Taxes (Sensitivity Analysis)
In section 3:3 we were dealing with a model in which waste recycling was con-
sidered: we may conclude that this process o¤-sets the constraint to growth
represented by exhaustible resources and reduces the environmental burden.
On the other hand, we know that to produce secondary materials we have to
divert the labor force from other sectors to recycling, and also that we may inter-
nalize the externality represented by the sub-optimal accumulation of waste by
introducing a Pigouvian tax. To make a comparison between the mixed regime
and that in which we use only a …scal measure, we make a sensitivity analysis
on the Hamiltonian as a whole (Kamien and Schwartz, 1991, Malanowski, 1984,
Seierstad and Sydæter, 1997), calculating its partial derivative with respect to
a parameter, representing an improvement in the waste recycling process, or
the Pigouvian tax, respectively. Here we are interested just in a quality analy-
sis because there are too many variables and parameters to make a numerical
calculus. Using @ from [19] and calculating its partial derivative at the optimal









This means that an improvement in the secondary materials production
process increases the value @¤, that is none other than the constrained optimal
welfare level (for an economic interpretation of the Hamiltonian see Dorfman,
1969).
In the Hamiltonian there is no parameter accounting for a change in Pigou-
vian tax, thus we may substitute ¿ in [19] for ¸5 when l3 =0(i.e. no waste




= ¡[(e¤ + r¤) ¡ °J¤] < 0:
In this case it is evident that an increase in Pigouvian tax reduces the value of
@¤, such that e¢cient management of refuse shows a better outcome in dynamics
than ¿. This result con…rms our …ndings in the previous paragraph.
4F i n a l R e m a r k s
Few words are necessary to conclude our paper. In cases of imperfect substi-
tutability between exhaustible and renewable resources the economy shows a
16worse performance than in cases where it is possible to use one natural input in-
stead of another indi¤erently in the production function. Technological progress
allows us to o¤-set the constraint to growth represented by exhaustible resources
by means of four di¤erent channels: …rstly, by improving substitutability be-
tween the resources; secondly, by reducing the amount of exhaustible natural
input drawn from the earth’s crust; thirdly, by increasing the amount of sec-
ondary materials that we are able to produce; fourthly, by sending the right
message to the system regarding the behavior over time of the prices of both
kinds of natural resource. Finally, the waste recycling process permits us to
achieve two results at the same time: to improve the marginal productivity
of exhaustible resources and to internalize fully the negative externality repre-
sented by waste stock accumulation. Using the …rst order conditions, the same
results are shown by the economy in both regimes, secondary materials pro-
duction and pure Pigouvian tax, but in the dynamics the former environmental
policy ensures greater positive e¤ects on the constrained optimal level of welfare.
These are the results of our theoretical framework; at the moment no em-
pirical analyses have been carried out on this issue. We think that it could be
a good topic for further applied studies.
Appendix
A. First Order and Transversality Conditions
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17[A10] _ ¸5 = ±¸5 ¡
@@
@J
= ±¸5 + J! ¡ °¸5:






































Di¤erentiating equations [A1], [A4] and [A5] logarithmically, the results will
be
[A16] g¸1 = guc;
[A17] g¸6 = g¸1 + gy;
[A18] g¸6 = g¸2 + gA:
Using [A2] and [A3], deriving logarithmically, we may also write
[A19] g¸3 = g¸4:
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